Gizmodo, 21 hours ago: "The FAA Is Rolling Out Its AI Air Traffic Tool Nationwide."
FAA, 3:54 p.m.: Nationwide ground stop. "All departing traffic should remain groundstopped until further notice." In other words, no end in sight.
Microsoft, busily implementing AI, suffered a huge outage yesterday through today in many of its web-delivered services.
At Microsoft, armies of technicians and engineers dug in and have largely got the services functioning again. FAA has fewer people -- there's your lean, "running the government like a business" approach, in this case Earl's Discount Variety, where they have only one clerk on duty at a time, who also stocks shelves -- but I have no doubt they've got everyone with a clue hard at work solving the problem and they will eventually succeed. Sorry about your vacation and that critical overnight air express shipment!
There seems to be a common thread here, and you can expect more of it. "A.I" as it presently exists is not up to doing critical tasks. Hey, maybe it will be, some day. It's pretty convincing to a lot of people right now. But when put to the test, it keeps collapsing like air-whipped bullshit on a hot summer's day, so maybe -- just maybe -- we might want to wait and keep on playing with it in applications where it doesn't gum up great swathes of email or endanger air travel, air travelers, and all us people on the ground under airplane routes? Or, I guess, we can wait until it really screws up and manages to kill a bunch of people, and live with the reaction.
Oh mighty Googly AI, what is the "Butlerian Jihad?"
Update: Here and elsewhere, some skeptics have said AI is unlikely to have been the cause of the FAA ground stop. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy's statement is incoherent, pointing to outdated "analog communications systems" causing "data network overloads." The most generous reading of this patent nonsense is that their links between ATC centers and radio transmission/reception sites* are presently using voice-over-IP, which is a relatively straightforward replacement for dedicated analog lines, and that the VOIP system shares the same (presumably secure and in some way isolated) data network as all the rest of the FAA comms -- radar info, the (originally) teletype system for notices to pilots, routing and scheduling comms and so on. What might overload this? As it happens, VOIP data usage is pretty steady; silence fills about as many bits as conversation. The other data is likewise consistent. The NOTAM system is busy and gets more so for spicy weather or high-traffic periods, but it's plain text, low bandwidth. The ACARS system that texts with plane crews is a similarly light load.
Hey, you know what would overload those data networks? Starting up a big, fat, interconnected AI that is intended to sort out optimum traffic routings on the fly, and has to keep communicating internally as it shuffles things around! It's a problem in the same class as playing chess with itself, a known heavy burn of computational horsepower, and high traffic if the information about the pieces on the board is scattered across an entire continent and constantly changing.
I stand by my theory: managers pushed to get the shiny new AI claptrap up and running, and it ate up the available bandwidth and then started crowding out all the other traffic, crashing their nationwide network before anyone caught on. VOIP would have been the next-largest user of bandwidth and got hit the hardest. There's almost certainly not going to be any one place where some team of geeks gets a real-time visualization of the total network traffic, so it may have gummed up and been restarted more than once before they realized they were hosed, gave up and started trying to get the things they broke working again.
__________________
* With a very few exceptions for ACARS, the military (UHF) plus long-haul stuff (HF) over oceans and in the outback, aviation comms are line-of-sight amplitude-modulated VHF voice in one band stuck in between the high end of FM broadcasting and TV channel 7, using essentially the same system no matter where you fly. "Line of sight" can be a very long way when one end of the link is way, way up there where airliners fly, but it's not infinite and there's a whole network of ground stations bristling with antennas, variously used by various flavors of air traffic control. It is indeed complex, and yes, it can go very wrong if changes are made incautiously.
Update
1 year ago
